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China's ban has triggered a crisis in the governance of global waste flows. It marks a fundamental challenge to the spatial fix that has characterised secondary resource recovery since the 1990s. In broad terms, that saw goods and materials declared waste in the Global North flow to China and the Global South, to be sold as second-hand goods, for reconditioning or repair, or to be recovered as cheap materials for further manufacturing (Tranberg-Hansen, 2000; Iles, 2004; Rivoli, 2005; Gregson et al. 2010; Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010; Gregson et al. 2012; Minter, 2013; Brooks, 2015; Lepawsky, 2015) . Paying attention to waste and recycling alters prevailing accounts of Global North and Global South. Inverting the expected trade patterns, buyers and traders from China and the Global South harvest 2 the wastes of the Global North (Abimbola, 2012; Alexander and Reno, 2012; Brooks, 2012; Minter, 2013) . Further, global resource recovery can be seen to be about meeting demand in production, rather than dumping waste on the environments and peoples of the Global South as global environmental justice literatures suggest (Clapp, 2001; BAN, 2002; Pellow, 2007; c.f. Lora-Wainwright, 2017 ). China's ban, however, signals that a major reworking of the economic geography of global resource recovery is in process.
In under a year, the Chinese government has thrown the global recycling industry into disarray. In banning these imports, China is shifting from being the metaphorical equivalent of the world's vacuum cleaner, hoovering up the majority of what the developed world declares to be rubbish, to being a highly selective importer of certain categories and grades of recoverable materials and a major generator and exporter of post-consumer discards. For instance, China is emerging as a major exporter of textiles and used clothing, with Chinesemanufactured and styled clothing increasingly prominent in African used-clothing markets (Postrel & Minter, 2018) .
Current discourse in the Global North trying to explain the China ban (e.g. House of
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2018) points to a supply-demand logic, specifically the substitution of domestically generated waste for externally harvested, as rising levels of domestic consumption have led to increased levels of domestically generated post-consumer discard. Other commentators argue that goods made in China for domestic consumption are manufactured to poor standards and are a source of poor quality recyclate (@AdamMinter -4 May 2018). They highlight that Chinese goods made for global export often use higher quality materials. It is the latter materials that matter most for secondary resource recovery. If one accepts these arguments, the supply side is not the main driver 3 behind the China ban. Instead there is a need to look to the demand side, particularly at manufacturing. In 2015 the Chinese government launched its Made in China programme.
Alongside an ambitious plan to upgrade production, moving it up the value chain, it recognised the poor quality of Chinese production for domestic consumption, and announced a parallel ambition that 95% of consumer goods manufactured for the domestic market will be at international standards by 2020.
The effect of the political commitment to the wholesale upgrading of Chinese manufacturing will be felt acutely in the secondary processing agglomerations that have emerged organically in China since the 1990s (Tong and Wang, 2004) . They are geographically proximate to the main South China ports and are heavily reliant on imports harvested from the Global North. An estimated 90% of materials passing through them are derived from OECD countries. Each cluster is dedicated to particular materials recovery streams. For example, Luqiao (an e-scrap centre) comprises 44 state-certified importers, 172 firms, 50 dismantling sites, 7 specialised markets, 3000 disassembly enterprises and over 2000 'self-employed entrepreneurs' (Chi et al. 2014) . These labour intensive industries, however, have no place in the imaginary that informs current economic policy in China.
Indeed, their presence is a barrier to China's upgrading ambitions.
In the remainder of this commentary we draw on 'grey' literature and trade press to provide 1) a synthesis of the policy developments that are currently upturning global resource recovery and consider their ramifications within China. 1 2) Taking the UK as our main case, Green Fence imposed a contamination threshold of 1.5%/bale, meaning any bale found containing more than 1.5% 'non-target' material (e.g. plastic in paper) would be rejected. An estimated 800,000 tonnes of material were rejected in the first six months (and sent back, Contemporaneous with, and allied to, the drive to ecological modernisation has been the promotion of circular economy ideals of closed loop materials circulation. In respect of ewaste, to take just one sector, the Circular Economy Promotion Law (2008) has seen the development of a form of extended producer responsibility (EPR), in which the government charges fees on Chinese manufacturers which are then used to subsidise state-certified (formal) recycling companies (Inverardi-Ferri, 2017a ). In accordance with industrial ecology principles, electrical and electronics manufacturers are encouraged by law to create their own recycling plants (Schulz, 2015) . Scrappage policies, notably the "Home Appliance Oldfor-New Rebate Program" (jiadian yi jiu huan xin zhengce) , which sought to boost domestic consumption post the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, required used goods to go to state-certified recycling companies rather than the informal sector (Inverardi-Ferri, 2017a ).The former are capital-intensive and typically located in an eco-park, not in the existing secondary processing agglomerations. There is some doubt as to their efficacy when compared to the productivity of those established agglomerations; doubly so, given the incentives are to scrap goods and recycle materials rather than recondition and reuse them (Schulz 2018 ).
To date, academic literature discussing the crackdown on labour intensive secondary processing in China has focused upon the displacement of previously tolerated informal, recycling in major cities (Tong & Tao, 2015; Inverardi-Ferri, 2017b; Schulz 2018) . Whilst the China's Green Fence and National Sword policies are but the most recent demonstration that waste and recycling are highly political markets, framed by policies that disallow some practices (dumping, polluting or burning) whilst incentivising others (e.g. scrapping or recycling) that configure both costs and (potential) resources. These markets indicate that the scale of analysis for waste and recycling is not confined to the household, the city or the national but is framed globally and characterised by connections and interdependences. We therefore consider the wider reverberations of China's ban, with a focus on the EU and particularly the UK -the member state hitherto most heavily reliant on exports to China. 
The case of UK municipal waste in light of the China ban
To understand why China's ban reverberates with such force in the UK, it is necessary to outline particularities of its municipal waste infrastructure, which in turn account for its dependence on the Chinese market.
Current waste infrastructure in the UK
EU-level policy embraced the Basel Convention and endeavoured to keep wastes generated within the EU within its own boundaries -although the leakiness of wastes across those borders, licitly and illicitly, is well established and evidenced by global trade. Simultaneously, it developed a preferential way of classifying options for dealing with waste materials, from landfill at the bottom, through incineration, and recycling/recovery, to re-use and reconditioning and waste prevention at the top -the 'Waste Hierarchy'. That hierarchy was incentivised financially, through fines applied to member states whose performance did not match rising targets.
In the UK this meant a dramatic shift, starting in the 1990s, from a historic reliance on landfill. Unlike the situation in Sweden, say, where public trust in incineration led to the development of a waste infrastructure of municipal combined heat and power, in the UK public opposition to energy-from-waste plants ('incinerators') led to a Waste Strategy (2002) that sought to divert waste materials from landfill to recovery for recycling. Mostly, and in line with the marketization of public sector services in the UK, this involved local government establishing public-private partnerships for municipal waste management.
Local authorities contracted out their waste services to commercial firms, who, in handling municipal waste, guaranteed to achieve an agreed percentage diversion of waste from 9 landfill to recycling. The means to that diversion is capital intensive technology -in most cases a materials recovery facility, which is an industrial plant, which sorts materials into specific types and (a limited number of) categories. So, plastic from paper, paper from card, plastic and paper from glass.
The upshot was that tonnage diversion from landfill was the primary policy metric, and waste in the UK was economized and financialised on the basis of weight (Gregson et al. 2015) . In accounting terms, what mattered for UK policy was to demonstrate the weight of material diverted from waste (landfill) by being recovered for recycling. Translated into a commercial operating environment, that meant that UK materials recovery plants were designed to process large amounts of garbage, separating it rapidly into materials types. This (crude) sorting valorises wastes in terms of quantity rather than material quality (defined in terms of low percentages of contaminants). Significantly, this means such reclaimed materials are only of interest to those who either are using low quality inputs or can undertake further, laborious reprocessing and sorting. Hence the UK came to depend on exporting low quality waste to China: for instance, in 2016, the UK collected ~8m tonnes of paper fibre, of which over 60% was exported, with 47% going to China (Recycling Association, 2018).
As the reconfiguration of waste through circular economy thinking has gained traction in European policy, alongside moral economies of the proximity principle and geostrategic concerns over resource security, there is an increasing focus on circulating high quality recyclates within the EU. The nature of the UK's municipal waste infrastructure with its 'comingled collection' systems, poor quality outputs and reliance on global export markets were all singled out for high level political criticism -not least because, in their dependence 10 on the global trade in wastes, they undermined the political attempt to create a European circular economy (Gregson et al. 2015) . Brexit may offer new options in a dispute that can be seen as the latest European waste controversy where the UK is positioned as "the dirty man (sic) of Europe". But, now the China Ban, and the removal of the UK's primary waste export market, changes the options available.
The emerging municipal waste crisis in the UK -a crisis of economization
The implications of China's ban for the UK's municipal waste infrastructure are far-reaching.
In the short term it has resulted in the physical accumulation of material in facilities, the sale of material down (not up) the Waste Hierarchy (i.e. instead of recycling there is energy reclamation, and in some instances, allegedly, landfill) and attempts to improve the quality of materials emanating from materials recovery facilities. The latter involves increased levels of manual labour, or 'dirty work' of the type that 'clean and green' ecological modernisation was meant to eliminate (Gregson et al. 2016 ). In the UK, much of that labour is performed by migrant workers, who, post Brexit, may be unavailable. Beyond the short term, however, this is a crisis of municipal waste's economization. Currently, it manifests around questions of financialisation and governance.
The crisis in financialisation is signalled by intense discussion within the sector on contracts Looking to the future, it is not inconceivable that some firms will walk away from contracts and investments. Should they do so then local authorities will have a full blown public waste crisis on their hands. In the interim, the ability of local authorities to control the kind of waste generated by their populations is in capital's cross hairs. When commercial operators publicly declare that they are "neither alchemists nor magicians" and state their refusal to engage with recycling collections that are 30% contaminated, they are firmly laying the blame for the UK's poor quality recyclates with consumers and local authorities who fail to crack down on their publics' poor recycling practices. What remains tacit here is the process of economization that underpins the UK's municipal waste infrastructure. This has converted a statutory public service into a private asset capitalised through unpaid household labour (that in the UK has to be cajoled into sorting waste into even rough categories e.g. landfill, recyclables and (sometimes) organic food waste), least cost collection systems that move that more-or-less sorted material from households and businesses to facilities, which then sort that material, but only sufficiently to produce low grade materials sold into the commodity markets. To turn that infrastructure into a system for producing quality recovered materials will require nothing short of a write-off of existing systems of collection and of capital plant, and their replacement with technologies and labour that treat, rather than merely sort, materials. Small wonder, then, that capital is 12 currently positioning the UK municipal waste crisis as a failure of local authority governance rather than of municipal waste's economization.
Future Directions
By way of conclusion we offer suggestions for future research.
There is a need for empirical research in three areas. Firstly, to revise the map of secondary resource flows and establish the new spatial fix for resource recovery. Experience shows that, given the poor data reporting over 'waste' (to put it benignly), this needs on-theground work beyond official data. (Schulz 2018 ). Third, it will be necessary to examine the crises in municipal waste governance in the Global North that have been set in train by China's ban. The UK may be the most affected of the European states, but at the time of writing there are parallel crises emerging elsewhere.
In the US for instance, within two months of the ban, Oregon alone had already approved waivers to dump 6,107 tons of erstwhile recycling (Allington 2018; c.f. CBC -27 December, 2017) , while New Zealand has seen increased exports to South East Asia but still recyclers have said they are 'sitting on a massive amount of paper and plastics' (Radio NZ 5 April 2018).
There is also a need to move away from the Northern-centric imaginaries that have dominated research in the field. Rather than starting with the wastes of the Global North and seeing China as a receiving point or dumping ground, recent events have shown China to be the motor here; the world view therefore needs to be, if not China-centric, then with China at its centre. Yet there is a need to go beyond recycling economies to connect to debates over resource scarcity/security. At the same time as the trade press is reporting the geographical displacement of Chinese capital invested in resource recovery into proximate states in South east Asia, parallel reports indicate different fractions of Chinese capital 14 looking to invest in secondary materials recovery and processing in the Global North (www.resource-recycling.com -3 April 2018). Of course, looking to invest is not inwardinvestment, but -should such investment begin to occur -it would indicate, that China's resource base is shifting to encompass urban mining on a global scale. It may be premature to talk of China's global urban mine but that new form of resource imperialism, in which the Global North is not just harvested but becomes the materials recovery location for 'Made in China', is the possibility that comes into view from a China-centred account.
